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agent’s behavior 
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Abstract 
Cognitive science is unusual in that cognitive scientists have dramatic disagreements
about the extension of their object of study, cognition. Tis paper defends a novel
analysis of the scientifc concept of cognition: that cognition is the sensitive
management of an agent’s behavior. Tis analysis is “modular,” so that its extension
varies depending on how one interprets certain of its constituent terms. I argue that
these variations correspond to extant disagreements between cognitive scientists. Tis
correspondence is evidence that the proposed analysis models the contemporary
understanding of cognition among scientists, without artifcially resolving questions
that are currently considered open.
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1. The Problem of Cognition 
Scientists in many disciplines disagree about the nature of their object of inquiry. For
example, there is ongoing controversy about how to understand life, 1 though this
controversy rarely affects the work of contemporary biologists (Cleland, 2012; Machery, 
2012). And there is little agreement on precisely what physical entities or events are
(Montero, 1999; Earman, 1975), though physicists and engineers get on regardless. It is
uncommon, though, that a scientifc enterprise feature foundational conficts about the
extension of its object of inquiry, and therefore the bounds of its inquiry.
Nevertheless, since the 1980s the extension of cognition has been contested, and
the cognitive science literature is replete with “border wars” over controversially 
1 I use small capitals to indicate reference to a concept. Cognition is a phenomenon, “cognition”
is a word, and cognition is a concept. In Sect. 3 onward, I indicate reference to
uninterpreted parameters with italics.
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cognitive phenomena including distributed cognition, extended cognition, embodied 
cognition, plant cognition, and other controversial cases. Tere have been some
attempts to adjudicate these disputes with various “marks of the cognitive” (notably 
Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Rowlands, 2009, 2010; Adams & Garrison, 2013; Buckner,
2015), but such proposals are generally as controversial as the judgments they vindicate. 
My goal in this paper is not to criticize these efforts nor to propose another criterion 
that seeks to settle which phenomena are “genuinely” cognitive. Rather, I aim to 
characterize the concept of cognition as understood by contemporary scientists,
including its rough edges and indeterminacies. Such a characterization would be
pluralistic (though perhaps not quite “relaxed” in Colin Allen’s [2017] sense). Put
another way, I propose to explicate the concept cognition ecumenically, so as to
represent its present controversies perspicuously, rather than to end them.
An ecumenical analysis of cognition will not settle the extension of cognition
or adjudicate the border wars, but there are other purposes such an analysis might serve
(see [Akagi, 2018] for more discussion). First, such an analysis could make explicit the
way cognitive scientists think about their object of study, especially in contrast to 
pretheoretic conceptions of cognition or thought, perspicuously representing
agreement and disagreement between scientists. Second, the scientifc concept of
cognition is poorly understood by laypeople and students, who are surprised that
scientists take cognition to include phenomena like emotion, motivation, and motor 
control. An ecumenical analysis of cognition could make cognitive science more
accessible to non-specialists. Tird, an ecumenical analysis could inform philosophical
research regarding topics that draw on the empirical sciences of the mind. Tese three
purposes can be accomplished even by an analysis that leaves the controversies of the 
cognition border wars open. And by leaving those controversies open, an ecumenical
account avoids the hubris of predicting what scientists will fnd or what form their
theories will take (as feared by e.g. Cleland [2012]; Allen [2017]; Ramsey [2017]; Akagi
[2018]).
My present task, therefore, is to defend a new analysis of the scientifc concept of
cognition that can serve these three purposes. I will begin by establishing landmarks 
for the contested extension of cognition, introducing test cases in three categories:
some paradigmatically cognitive phenomena, some phenomena generally agreed not to
be within the purview of cognitive science, and several controversial cases from the 
border wars (Section 2). I will describe a method I call modular analysis that models
contested extensions (Section 3). Ten I will describe the sensitive management
hypothesis (SMH), a modular analysis according to which, in a slogan, cognition is the 
   
       
          
      
         
            
         
            
        
        
       
    
          
   
          
      
       
             
              
  
 
       
            
          
  
         
               
          
         
                  
           
3ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
sensitive management of an agent’s behavior (Section 4). I will argue that the sensitive 
management hypothesis correctly classifes the test cases, thus providing strong
evidence of its extensional adequacy (Section 5), before refecting on the hypothesis’ 
potential to serve the three purposes described above (Section 6).
2. Test Cases 
Even if we ignore the disagreements of the border wars, contemporary cognitive
scientists use the word “cognition” in at least two distinct senses (see Greene et al., 2004, 
p. 389; Rowlands, 2009, p. 7; Akagi, 2018, pp. 3553f.) which I’ll call highfalutin and
inclusive cognition. “Cognition” in its highfalutin sense (“higher cognition”) has an
extension similar to that of the pretheoretic concept thought, and is generally 
understood in contrast to perception or affect. Highfalutin “cognition” is a scientifc
term, and features in scientifc expressions like “cognitive therapy” and “cognitive
control.” However, cognitive scientists ofen speak of cognition in a broader sense such 
that its extension also includes perceptual, emotional, motivational, and (some) motor
phenomena. Te extension of “cognition” in this inclusive sense is, even on a 
conservative reckoning, revisionary relative to a lay understanding of “cognition” or
“thought.” Both highfalutin and inclusive “cognition” have contested extensions, but the
purview of cognitive science defnitely includes many perceptual and affective
phenomena, which are happily called “cognition” by many. So insofar as the border wars
are about the bounds of the cognitive sciences they must be about which phenomena
count as cognitive in the inclusive sense.
Te border wars notwithstanding, cognitive scientists generally agree about many 
paradigmatic cases of inclusive cognition. For example, face recognition—the capacity
of humans (and perhaps some other animals) to distinguish and recognize individual
faces visually—is a cognitive capacity. In humans this capacity is explained by cortical 
activity (ofen with a focus on the right fusiform gyrus; see e.g. Kanwisher, 2010). Other
uncontroversially cognitive phenomena include a typical person’s capacity to navigate a
familiar city, as well as the capacities to see color, make decisions, feel disgust, and
control one’s limbs, at least when these capacities belong to animals not using external 
aids or other technology. Cognitive scientists also agree on many consensual cases of 
non-cognitive phenomena. A rock warming in the sun is not a cognitive phenomenon.
Nor is the erosion of a stream bed, or the relationship between the time it takes light to
reach the Earth and the distance of its point of origin.
   4 M. AKAGI
      
         
            
    
     
  
  
            
       
        
         
       
          
         
     
          
           
  
        
         
         
   
         
  
      
         
          
          
      
      
           
 
                  
       
      
                
             
           
But many phenomena are controversially cognitive, where contrary verdicts are
associated with theoretical frameworks and empirical research programs. I will focus
throughout this paper on six phenomena that each have vigorous proponents and
opponents in various disciplines (though I will largely cite philosophers in what follows, 
since philosophers tend to be the most explicit about abstract commitments). Readers
familiar with these cases could skip to Section 3.
First, proponents of distributed cognition contend that the coordinated activity of 
multiple agents sometimes constitutes a kind of cognition over and above individual
cognition. For example, maritime navigation—the representation and planning of a
ship’s course—is not attributable to any individual sailor, even with help. Rather,
navigation is a cognitive task accomplished by a system that consists of crewmembers, 
their equipment, and their implementation of various procedures (Hutchins, 1995).
Second, disputes about robot cognition are as old as cognitive science and older
(Turing, 1950; Putnam, 1967) but recent discussions ofen invoke the robot Herbert,
which moved autonomously, avoided obstacles, and pilfered unattended soda cans 
(Brooks et al., 1988). Herbert is sometimes regarded as a compelling model for cognition
(Brooks, 1991), 2 and sometimes regarded as an elaborate tool with no cognitive
capacities (Adams & Garrison, 2013).
Tird, Otto is a fctional man who accommodates a memory impairment through
use of a notebook. Proponents of extended cognition hold that Otto’s cognitive processes 
occur partly outside his skin, in the notebook (Clark & Chalmers, 1998); opponents 
argue that while the notebook must be involved in the explanation of Otto’s behavior, 
the notebook itself is not part of a cognitive mechanism (see e.g. Adams & Aizawa, 2001; 
Rupert, 2004).3 
Fourth, proponents of embodied cognition argue that cognition occurs in parts of 
the body outside the central nervous system (Varela et al., 1991; Chemero, 2009). For
example, female crickets have special adaptations allowing them to reliably locate mates.
A system of tracheal tubes in their bodies amplifes the frequencies of conspecifc
mating calls (Webb, 1994). Proponents of embodied cognition claim that the tracheal 
tubes are components of the cricket’s cognitive system, whereas opponents argue that
the cognitive action, so to speak, is entirely in the cricket’s neural tissue.
2 Brooks does not defend Herbert as a case of genuine cognition per se, but he suggests that
cognition (or “intelligence”) need consist in nothing more than the kinds of capacities Herbert
possesses, produced by mechanisms like Herbert’s.
3 In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, Otto is an example of the extended mind hypothesis,
which is stronger and more speculative than the extended cognition hypothesis. But Otto is
the most discussed example in the extended cognition literature, so I use it here.
   
         
             
      
  
             
                
            
    
    
         
             
 
    
       
    
     
         
            
            
        
               
     
         
           
        
      
       
 
 
               
          
             
             
              
          
5ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Fifh, proponents of plant cognition maintain that plants behave, though at longer
time scales than animals, and that this behavior is coordinated by cognitive processes.
John Haugeland (1991) once supposed that if a “super-sunfower” could track the 
direction of the sun in the absence of sunlight, it would possess cognitive capacities. 
Paco Calvo (Calvo Garzón, 2007) argues that Lavatera cretica is such a plant; it orients
toward the sun even when the sun is obscured for several days. Calvo and others now
suggest that plants are capable of learning, and fexible decision-making based on
multiple cues (Segundo-Ortin & Calvo, 2019).
Sixth, there are defenders of microbe cognition. Te example most familiar to
philosophers is Fred Dretske’s (1986): “magnetotactic” bacteria direct their locomotion, 
e.g. away from oxygenated water, through sensitivity to the Earth’s magnetic feld. Tis
adaptive locomotion is sometimes regarded as cognitive behavior.
Tese six contentious cases of cognition—distributed cognition in maritime
navigation, robot cognition in Herbert, extended cognition in the Otto-notebook
system, embodied cognition in cricket audition, plant cognition in L. cretica
phototropism, and cognition in bacterial magnetotaxis—do not represent all of the 
disputes of the border wars. In particular, they do not represent disputes that concern
the proper method of modeling or explaining cognition, e.g. disputes over dynamicism
(van Gelder, 1998). But they illustrate a substantial amount of the favor and variety of
scientifc views about the contested extension of cognition.
3. Modular Analysis 
My aim is to produce an analysis of cognition that is adequate to these cases—not
by settling whether the controversial cases are “genuinely” cognitive, but by correctly 
classifying cases as consensually cognitive, controversially cognitive, or consensually
non-cognitive. Since these cases refect informed scientifc judgments, rather than lay
judgments, the proposed analysis will be an empirically-informed one (as is urged by 
e.g. Kornblith [2017]). Traditional conceptual analyses consisting of necessary or 
sufficient conditions do not accomplish non-dichotomous classifcations gracefully, so
I will avail myself of a method called modular analysis.4 
4 For fans of Carnapian explication: we can consider the pretheoretic concept of cognition an
explicandum (an imprecise, old concept), and the scientifc concept of inclusive cognition (my
analysandum) an explicatum of sorts (a new concept embedded in a theoretical context), in
want of an explicans, or characterizing expression. Modular analysis is a non-standard form
for an explicans. In general the extensions of explicata can differ signifcantly from the
extensions of their explicanda, but SMH is meant as a precise characterization of an existing
   6 M. AKAGI
         
                 
 
         
         
       
           
              
        
    
                
           
           
              
            
      
           
            
     
    
               
              
              
             
   
             
     
   
            
        
          
     
 
               
       
Consider the following toy analysis of the concept brave:
An action φ, performed by an agent a, is brave iff φ is dangerous for a and φ is
admirable.
Suppose that in our toy linguistic community there is general agreement concerning
which actions are dangerous for their agents, but disagreement concerning which are 
admirable. We can model the usage of brave in this community by understanding the 
analysis above as a traditional analysis (with necessary and sufficient conditions), except
that the extension of admirable varies based on the diverse ways that members of
the community reckon admirableness for actions. I call an analysis so understood a
modular analysis, since the function (from actions to semantic values) corresponding 
to the predicate “admirable” can be swapped out for a different function. Let us refer to
swappable predicates like “admirable” as parameters (by analogy with the use of the
term in mathematics, where assigning values to parameters transforms a schematic
formula into a specifc one, and since the term “variable” is normally reserved in
predicate calculus for names that can be arguments of predicates). Te different
functions correspond to different criteria for ascribing parameterized predicates, and
can be called “values” of the parameter or, more colloquially, “interpretations.”
Parameters ofen correspond to loci of disagreement between users of a contested
concept. A modular analysis proper (that is, a module analysis considered without a 
domain parameter values) represents the extension of the analysandum as a relation to
the various values of its parameters. Modular analysis as used here is meant to be a
modeling strategy, not an insight into the secret, “true” meanings of some concepts. Te
beneft of a modular analysis is that it yields multiple extensions for its analysandum
(e.g. brave), so it can represent a state of disagreement about how to use the
analysandum concept and license appropriate inferences about the ways various 
speakers use concepts. Yet modular analyses are easy to understand, and perspicuously
represent both the commonalities and differences in the ways that members of the 
linguistic community use the analyzed term.
Perhaps, for example, Marilyn is an older woman who enjoys skydiving, a
dangerous activity for its agent. Her friend Chandana thinks Marilyn’s skydiving is
admirable, because she is inspired by Marilyn’s defance of social expectations. Marilyn’s
son Kasson, by contrast, considers skydiving irresponsible; he does not see skydiving as 
but informal explicatum, so in order to be adequate it must describe the extant, contested
usage of “cognition” in its inclusive sense.
   
   
          
              
     
             
          
  
 
         
         
             
             
             
           
              
         
      
        
           
               
       
         
            
    
               
             
             
   
  
      
7ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
admirable. Marilyn herself has no opinion on whether skydiving is admirable. Te toy
analysis above may be considered an extensionally adequate modular analysis if and 
only if it licenses the correct inferences about who thinks Marilyn’s skydiving is brave:
if Chandana considers it brave, Kasson does not, and Marilyn has no opinion. We may
say of predicates like “brave” and “admirable” that they each have multiple sectarian
extensions, i.e. the relatively classical extensions they have corresponding to Chandana’s 
judgments, to Kasson’s judgments, etc.). Some sectarian extensions of “admirable” 
contain skydiving, and some do not. However, each predicate has only one ecumenical
extension, which corresponds to the set of its sectarian extensions.
Te introduction of parameters into analyses creates some methodological hazards
that must be managed. First of all, since analyses should provide criteria and not vague
guidelines, it must be clear which predicates in the analysis function as parameters and
which do not. And distinct parameters should be relatively independent of each other
(the choice of interpretations across parameters should be at least logically 
independent). Second, the extensional adequacy of a modular analysis must be assessed
relative to the values of its parameters, so counterexamples are only valid if they
correspond to a consistent way of speaking. For instance, it is no objection to the toy
analysis that skydiving is admirable (according Chandana) but not brave (according to 
Kasson). A licit counterexample requires that all expressions be interpreted coherently 
(e.g. if skydiving is brave according to Chandana but not admirable according to 
Chandana). In addition, a modular analysis cannot be thoroughly assessed for
extensional adequacy unless we specify the permissible interpretations of its parameters. 
Ideally, we should be able to acquire evidence about the values of the parameters for
particular subcommunities of speakers (or contexts of use) independently of evidence 
about the usage of the analysandum. For example, in our toy scenario we determine
whether Kasson sees skydiving as admirable and, independently, whether he sees it as
brave. If we cannot gather independent evidence about the values of the parameters 
they are “free parameters,” which permit a degree of ad-hocness. It is a virtue for
analyses and other empirical formulae to have as few free parameters as possible.
4. The Sensitive Management Hypothesis 
Modular analyses have the right form for modeling the extensions of contested concepts
like cognition. Consensually cognitive phenomena should belong to every sectarian
extension of cognition, controversially cognitive phenomena should belong to some 
but not all sectarian extensions, and consensually non-cognitive phenomena should 
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belong to no sectarian extensions. I am only concerned to accommodate frst-order
judgments of cognitive scientists (i.e. about which phenomena are cognitive), not 
higher-order judgments (i.e. general claims about what kind of thing cognition is). And
unlike traditional Jackson-style analysis (Jackson, 1998), I ignore lay judgments. Te test 
cases described in Section 2 refect scientifc judgments about cognition that are
informed by the counterintuitive empirical fndings and theories of the last half-century. 
An analysis that is adequate to those test cases and others like them will refect an
empirically-informed concept of cognition, not a pretheoretic one.
I contend that the test cases described in Section 2 are correctly classifed by the 
sensitive management hypothesis (SMH), a modular analysis according to which, in a 
slogan, cognition is the sensitive management of an agent’s behavior. More precisely, the 
sensitive management hypothesis is that
A process φ is a cognitive process if and only if φ is a component process of a
mechanism m, where:
1. m belongs to an agent a,
2. m is sensitive to the circumstances of a, and
3. m manages the behavior of a.
SMH contains three parameters: belonging to an agent (abbreviated as
agent), sensitivity to circumstances (sensitivity), and behavior.
While some of these terms are neologisms, they each correspond to concepts that have
received signifcant attention from philosophers of cognitive science. When the
parameters are each assigned an interpretation, the analysis determines a sectarian 
extension. SMH is extensionally adequate only if, with different assignments of
interpretations to these parameters, the sectarian extensions of this formula always
include consensual cases of cognition, never include the consensual non-cases, and
variously contain or exclude controversial cases like the six test cases described in
Section 2. I will discuss the numbered conditions and their parameters in the next
section; frst I will unpack some unparameterized features of SMH .
SMH provides criteria for identifying cognitive processes, but can be used to defne
a number of other specifc expressions. Cognition is the manifestation of a cognitive
process. Cognitive mechanisms are mechanisms that satisfy conditions 1–3. Cognitive
states are functional states of cognitive mechanisms. A cognitive system is an exhaustive 
collection of cognitive mechanisms belonging to a particular agent. Cognitive behaviors
are behaviors that are managed by cognitive mechanisms. Cognitive capacities are
   
           
      
              
             
         
         
          
             
   
            
 
 
                  
             
         
            
         
       
         
       
       
        
 
            
         
              
        
   
    
              
          
 
              
                
    
9ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
capacities to exhibit cognitive behavior, or functional capacities of components of
cognitive mechanisms, and so on.Tese formulations are consistent with the judgments
of most cognitive scientists, e.g. that “cognition” does not refer to any behavior itself,
but to the processes that produce it (Shapiro, 2013; Aizawa, 2017). It is sometimes
suggested that some enactivists identify cognition with behavior, rather than with a
precursor of behavior. However, even unorthodox judgments like this might be
accommodated if “cognition” per se is identifed with what I call “cognitive behavior” 
instead of “cognitive processes.”5 And I expect that enactivists would accept that there
are processes that explain cognitive behavior, though they will fnd them in unorthodox
places—associated with non-animal agents, and ofen located outside of the bodies of 
those agents—or they might appeal to processes that are not straightforwardly
decomposable or localizable.
I analyze cognition in terms of “mechanisms,” but intend this term to be less 
freighted than it may at frst appear. Of course, it is in line with some recent trends in
the philosophy of science to understand some theories in the biological and behavioral
sciences as concerned with mechanisms. Te new mechanists (Machamer et al., 2000;
Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008) claim that the main
explanatory project of many special sciences is not to articulate universal, exceptionless 
natural laws, but to describe naturally-occurring structures—mechanisms—that
exhibit phenomena we want to explain. Tese mechanisms are typically understood as 
organized complexes of component parts and operations.
Some argue that models in cognitive explanations are not mechanistic in this sense, 
despite the many similarities between cognitive models and mechanistic models in the 
biological sciences, because “the way in which [cognitive models] correspond to the
underlying modeled system is far less straightforward” (Weiskopf, 2011, p. 332), or 
because some cognitive models do not derive their explanatory power from strategies
of localization and decomposition (Silberstein & Chemero, 2013). I take it that these
arguments are basically sound, but we lack a good word to refer to the truth-makers of
the diverse sorts explanations found in cognitive science—unless that word is,
confusingly, “mechanism,” which is the word that cognitive scientists ofen use (and 
which had a life in the philosophical literature before the new mechanists; cf. Wakefeld, 
1992; Cummins, 2000). So I propose to use the word “mechanism” here to refer
indiscriminately to whatever is described by adequate explanations in cognitive science:
5 I’m not sure this is the correct reading—enactivists like Chemero, Noë, and Hutto and Myin
seem to regard cognition as an interactive process of which behavior is a proper part rather
than a causal consequence.
   
      
     
   
          
         
             
      
       
            
       
    
         
              
   
            
   
            
          
        
             
            
         
   
  
              
          
             
              
         
           
    
            
         
10 M. AKAGI
biological mechanisms, generic mechanisms (Stinson, 2016), target structures of
adequate Weiskopf-style cognitive models, network dynamics (Silberstein & Chemero, 
2013), concrete instances of functional analyses (Cummins, 1975), complexes of 
organism capacities and Gibsonian invariants (Gibson, 1979), and so on. While this is a
heterodox understanding of “mechanisms,” it is anodyne. Mechanisms will, in general, 
be structures that are organized such that they produce phenomena of interest, which
in cognitive science are typically either certain capacities of agents or context-sensitive
variations in behavior (i.e. “effects”; see Cummins, 2000). But the components of
mechanisms in this weak sense may be relatively abstract. Te components of cognitive
mechanisms might include representations, modules, network properties, perceivable
invariants in an environment, or arbitrary realizers of a functional role. Te 
organization of mechanisms is ofen represented by graphs (see Danks, 2014), but can
be specifed more or less completely by equations or by description. Of course some
cognitive models are phenomenal, not mechanistic (Craver, 2006; Hochstein, 2012), but 
even phenomenal models describe phenomena for which mechanisms in this thin sense
are presumably responsible.
At any rate, “mechanism” is not a parameter in SMH . Disagreement about the
nature of mechanisms is primarily disagreement among philosophers about what
scientifc practice is or should be, not disagreement between cognitive scientists about
the merits of particular research programs. Te existing practice and research goals of
scientists are the standards against which various accounts of mechanism are judged
(see e.g. Chirimuuta, 2014; Ross, 2015). At any rate, I am not convinced that differing
interpretations of “mechanism” in the above sense correlate with different judgments 
concerning the extension of cognition. More expressions could be parameterized
on a fner-grained view that aimed to articulate points of controversy beyond those of
the border wars, but since explanatory power is inter alia a result of effective parameter
reduction, I limit the number of parameters to the three I describe below.
5. Reproducing Expert Disagreement with Parametric Variation 
Since a modular analysis cannot be evaluated without a domain of parameters, I will
describe several values for each parameter, describing how they can be manipulated in
order to selectively include or exclude various controversial cases, while consistently
including paradigmatic cases and excluding non-cases. In principle, an interpretation
is licit so long as it corresponds to a scientifcally legitimized way of thinking about
cognitive processes (for instance, one exhibited in published literature by cognitive
   
           
      
             
              
           
              
        
  
        
  
   
               
  
         
                
             
       
   
            
            
               
  
           
          
   
         
  
          
     
          
 
             
     
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 11
scientists). I cannot describe an exhaustive list of licit values for the parameters here, so
I will enumerate only three interpretations for each parameter, assuming for the sake of
illustration that no other interpretations are permissible. Tis little fction will allow me
to illustrate the favor of SMH as a modular analysis. Te interpretations I describe are
sufficiently varied to account for the test cases in Section 2. I submit that correct 
classifcation of the test cases is good, though defeasible, evidence for the adequacy of
SMH as an analysis proper, which may be supplemented by subtler interpretations. For
each parameter I will begin by considering relatively restrictive interpretations, 
discussing more liberal interpretations in turn. Te interpretations are summarized in
Table 1.
[Table 1 around here.]
5.1. Belonging to an Agent 
Most parties to the border wars seem to agree that it is objectionable to ascribe “un-
owned” cognitive processes (Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Rupert, 2009; Clark, 2010a; 
Rowlands, 2010), though Rowlands is unusual in discussing the details of “belonging” 
to a subject at length (2010, Ch. 6). Rupert calls the owner or container of a cognitive
process a “cognitive system.” Rowlands calls it a “representational subject.” Let us call
that critter, whatever it is, a “cognitive agent” or “agent.”6 
Cognitive agents in this sense need not be the “organisms” of biological theory, 
though paradigmatic cognitive mechanisms like those in the brain are parts of
biological organisms. So let us say that on one interpretation of agent (agentα), a 
mechanism belongs to an agent only if it is a nondetached part of the body of a
biological organism. (Te requirement that such parts be nondetached excludes e.g. 
secretions and body parts that have been shed, e.g. hairs, feathers, skin, shells.) Now, 
Otto is a biological organism, but SMH countenances Otto’s extended memory only if
(parts of) his notebook can be considered cognitive mechanisms for him. Otto’s 
notebook is not a nondetached part of his body, since the notebook is separable from
him and is sometimes physically distant (presumably he bathes without it). So the Otto-
notebook system does not belong to the extension of agentα. On a second 
interpretation of agent (agentβ), a mechanism belongs to an agent if and only if it 
regularly and reliably promotes the goals of a biological organism. Since Otto’s notebook
6 For suggesting this term, I thank many colleagues including Joshua Shepherd, Samuel Asarnow, 
Peter Aronoff, and Lewis Powell.
   
                
   
           
            
           
            
                 
                 
            
     
           
           
              
        
         
                
    
          
           
  
       
        
              
   
            
            
  
           
           
          
          
   
12 M. AKAGI
helps him to navigate to his desired destination, it can belong to him in the sense
required by agentβ.
A more liberal interpretation of agent might allow that an agent be any goal-apt
system: any critter to which we attribute goals, such as survival and reproduction, or 
perhaps other goals such as constructing shelter, mauling yonder antelope, or following
an experimenter’s instructions. Anything to which we can apply Dennett’s (1987)
intentional stance is an agent in this sense. Let a mechanism belong to an agent in the 
sense of agentγ if and only if it regularly and reliably promotes the goals of a goal-apt
system. Hutchins’ ship may count as an agentγ, so long as we attribute goals to it like
traveling safely to its destination. And the navigation team—along with their equipment
and procedures—are parts of a mechanism that promotes this goal. Similarly, Herbert 
possesses mechanisms that promote its goals, such as avoiding collisions and
appropriating soda cans. Tis third interpretation respects the judgments of those who,
like Fred Adams and Rebecca Garrison, deny that Herbert is a cognitive system on the
ground that while Herbert appears to be goal-directed, it does not really have goals of 
its own; Herbert’s apparent goals are really the goals of Herbert’s creators (2013, pp. 342,
347f.). If Herbert has no genuine goals, it is not an agentγ and therefore possesses no
mechanisms that satisfy SMH .
Since navigation teams, Otto’s notebook, and Herbert’s robotic gizmos are each
included in some but not all of these interpretations (α–γ) of belonging to an
agent, they are controversial cases of things that belong to an agent. Te face-
recognizing mechanism in cortex, however, consensually belongs to an agent. It is part 
of the body of a biological organism, it promotes the goals of a biological organism, and
it promotes the goals of a goal-apt system (i.e. a person). By contrast, consensually non-
cognitive systems are excluded. A rock warming in the sun is not a biological individual
nor a goal-apt system that possesses mechanisms. Similarly, by interpreting the other
parameters of the sensitive management hypothesis, we can account for the variation
in expert judgment about the other test cases.
5.2. Sensitivity to Circumstances 
Cognitive mechanisms must be sensitive to the circumstances of an agent. I do not 
intend sensitivity to be understood in the sense generally meant by epistemologists
(e.g. Nozick, 1981), but in the sense that (assuming normal operation) the mechanism’s
functional states depend causally on selected states of affairs, perhaps imperfectly, but
with non-accidental reliability. Te language of “sensitivity” is intended to include 
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accounts that rely on some notion of representation, as well as accounts that deny that
“representation” so-called is necessary for cognition (e.g. Chemero, 2009; van Gelder, 
1995; Brooks, 1991). Even anti-representational accounts acknowledge that cognition
involves sensitivity to an agent’s circumstances; they simply deny that the forms of 
sensitivity we discover when we examine cognitive systems are always happily called
“representation.” Appeals to representation and its analogues are the most common
strategy for adjudicating border war disputes, and the variable interpretations of the
sensitivity parameter are meant to subsume most disagreements that turn on such
appeals (though of course there are more, and more subtle, extant interpretations than 
I will discuss).
“Circumstances” here refers to states of affairs that bear on an agent’s goals, either
by being consistent with those goals, inconsistent with those goals, or by being such that
an agent must modulate its behavior according to them in order to pursue its goals.
Agents are generally sensitive only to a proper subset of their circumstances (cf. 
Millikan, 2017, pp. 146f. on the relativity of signs). Sensitivity is paradigmatically 
achieved through perceptual, interoceptive, or inferential processes, though other kinds
of processes may also exhibit sensitivity to circumstances. It is sufficient for 
condition (2) of SMH that a mechanism’s operation be modulated distally according to 
such sensitivities. For example, “place cells” in parahippocampal cortex respond
differentially to an agent’s position in space (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971), though they 
are rarely reckoned to be part of a perceptual system in the way that cells in visual cortex 
are. Nevertheless, their activity is sensitive to the agent’s circumstances. Tis sensitivity 
is of course mediated by the connections between place cells and other brain regions 
(just as, for example, a neuron can have a “receptive feld” in virtue of mediated causal
dependency).
Te most traditional understanding of sensitivity to circumstances is
that a mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances only if it represents those
circumstances, whatever “represents” means. For example, consider the role of cortical
areas in visual face-recognition. Since patterns of neural activity are thought to be
involved in facial recognition, brain areas (like right fusiform gyrus) are ofen said to
represent faces (Kanwisher [2010], for example, uses representational language freely).
Natural representations typically involve manipulations of a representing medium with
functional signifcance in a mechanism—e.g. a pattern of neural activity—where
different states of the medium track differences in the representand—e.g. visually
distinct faces.
   
              
          
         
            
         
            
   
      
      
        
    
    
         
 
            
            
            
           
 
            
             
            
       
           
  
       
         
       
      
           
        
     
             
14 M. AKAGI
Activity in the fusiform gyrus is furthermore taken to be a case of representation
with “intrinsic” or “non-derived” content—the sort of content had by mental
representations but not by conventional representations like maps or printed words.
Representations with merely derived content are ofen supposed to have content in
virtue of their relations to representations with non-derived content, like mental
representations. Te stipulation that cognitive sensitivity be cashed out in terms of
representations with non-derived content is controversial, but nevertheless fgures in 
many accounts of cognitive representation (e.g. Searle, 1980; Adams & Aizawa, 2001; 
Rowlands, 2010). So we have our frst interpretation of the parameter, sensitivityα: 
a mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances only if represents some of those
circumstances, and the representational content is non-derived. Representations in 
cortical face-recognizing mechanisms satisfy this requirement.
Te writing in Otto’s notebook does not have non-derived content. Defenders of 
extended cognition usually deny that cognitive sensitivity must be understood in terms 
of representations with non-derived content, and they tend to be suspicious of the very
notion (e.g. Clark, 2005). Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that Otto’s mnemonic
mechanisms are realized in part by the state of his notebook, which is understood to
have merely derived content. By denying that cognitive representations must have non-
derived content, Clark and Chalmers make space in their conception of cognition for 
Otto’s notebook to serve as part of a cognitive mechanism. Likewise, Hutchins’
maritime navigators rely on representations with derived content, such as charts. Let us
capture this more liberal perspective with a second interpretation of the parameter
(sensitivityβ): a mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances only if it 
represents some of those circumstances (where the representational content may be
derived or non-derived).
On a third interpretation of sensitivity (sensitivityγ), a mechanism is
sensitive to an agent’s circumstances if it functions to transform information about an
agent’s circumstances, even if it has no representing medium. Since I’m not defending 
a specifc account of sensitivity I don’t wish to favor any particular information concept 
(e.g. Shannon [1948] information; Millikan’s [2017] natural information). Let us say that 
tracheal tubes in crickets satisfy sensitivityγ since they modify sound waves so as 
to emphasize the egocentric direction of conspecifc mating calls. Likewise, Herbert’s
mechanisms satisfy sensitivityγ. Many would be uncomfortable calling such
sensitivity representational (e.g. William Ramsey 2007), since most physiological
processes might exhibit sensitivity in this sense. Even so, no features of stones and
   
          
  
          
       
        
           
      
          
               
         
              
 
          
          
  
         
              
 
      
 
    
          
       
          
          
     
          
             
            
 
                  
         
        
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 15
stream beds meet this permissive criterion, since stones and stream beds lack goals and
therefore circumstances.
Each of these interpretations of the sensitivity parameter corresponds to
avowed commitments of various researchers. Te variation in researcher commitments 
about sensitivity mirrors complementary variations in researcher commitments about
which phenomena are cognitive. Neural representations of faces satisfy all these
interpretations. Tey satisfy the analyses of sensitivityα and sensitivityβ 
because they are ex hypothesi representations with non-derived content. And they are
sensitiveγ because they are part of a mechanism that enables people to satisfy a goal:
recognizing individual conspecifcs. However, as I argued, several of our controversial
cases satisfy some but not all of these interpretations, and our consensual non-cases of
cognition do not satisfy even the most liberal interpretation. 
If SMH is an adequate ecumenical analysis of cognition, then this is precisely
the relationship we should expect. It illustrates the relationship that parameterized
terms (like sensitivity) have to variations in willingness to ascribe cognition. 
Furthermore, variation in interpretations of the sensitivity parameter incorporates
variation in scientists’ commitments about whether cognition is representational, and 
which varieties of representation (or near-relatives, as in the case of the operation of
adaptive mechanisms in cricket audition) are necessary for cognition. Tus the
sensitivity parameter corresponds to a well-established strategy for adjudicating
disagreements about the extension of cognition.
5.3. Managing Behavior 
Finally, cognitive mechanisms must manage the behavior of agents. A mechanism
“manages” behavior just in case a pattern of behavior—i.e. certain behavior-types in
some circumstances and distinct behavior-types in other circumstances—depends 
causally on the mechanism’s functional state, assuming normal operation (the
circumstances in question being the same circumstances to which cognitive 
mechanisms are sensitive).7 Te management of behavior by cognitive mechanisms
should be relatively causally specifc (Woodward, 2010; Haueis, 2018; though a causal 
specifcity requirement means little without a way of individuating behavior-types).
Path integration in desert ants is a cognitive phenomenon in which the ant’s locomotion
is managed. Some locomotive movements are caused rather than others, and the
7 I use the awkward language of causal dependence in order to allow for the Dretskean view that
system-internal “causes of behavior” are in fact parts of the behavior—which is a process— 
rather than events that are causes of bodily motions called “behavior” (Dretske, 1988).
   
 
        
              
 
            
           
      
         
         
             
          
            
      
         
      
    
            
        
               
             
              
             
            
            
              
          
              
            
            
              
           
    
           
         
     
            
16 M. AKAGI
difference is ascribable to the ant’s circumstances (e.g. its destination being at such-and-
such a bearing). By contrast, causing an irregular muscle spasm is a poor candidate for
the management of behavior if it cannot be explained by appeal to any adaptive
character.
Te behavior condition of SMH allows for mediated management of behavior, just
as the sensitivity condition allows for mediated sensitivity to circumstances. So the on-
line control of grasping movements (e.g. Jeannerod, 1984) is the management of
behavior, and face-recognition mechanisms also manage behavior since the recognition
of a face (e.g. as Sanna’s rather than Christy’s) has effects that, in some situations, 
manifest as differences in behavior (e.g. uttering “Hi, Sanna,” instead of “Hi, Christy”).
In much cognitive science, a mechanism’s relation to behavior is an object of
attention less ofen than its sensitivity. Nevertheless, such a connection is presumed for
any putatively cognitive process, and the discovery that a process has no effect on 
behavior would entail that it is not a cognitive process (this requirement echoes 
“consumer-based” accounts of representation, e.g. Millikan, 1984). For example, 
consider a honeybee hive construed as a cognitive agent (a goal-apt system per
agentγ). It was controversial for some time whether foraging honeybees are guided
by the waggle dances of their sisters (Munz, 2005). Despite robust correlations between
the properties of bee dances and the location of a food source relative to the hive, it was 
not always clear that witnessing a waggle dance affected the subsequent behavior of
foragers. If it had turned out that the dances did not affect the behavior of other bees, I 
submit that cognitive scientists would resist the claim that waggle dances are cognitive
mechanisms for honeybee hives (although the dances are still behaviors of individual
bees). Rather, the dances would merely be fascinating performances that served no
function in the life of the hive. To take another example, Susan Goldin-Meadow argues
that gesturing can improve learning and thinking (Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005). 
Her evidence is ofen cited by proponents of embodied cognition, some of whom claim
that physical gesturing is itself a part of a cognitive mechanism—not only a behavior. 
Tis is because gesturing manages the successful performance of other behaviors, e.g.
the performance of memory tasks or the acquisition of new skills. Tus, some external
performances are parts of cognitive mechanisms since they manage other behaviors
(Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Clark, 2007).
Although psychology is said to be the scientifc study of behavior, explicit criteria 
for counting a performance as a behavior are rarely discussed. Tere is an ample 
literature distinguishing intentional action from mere behavior, but little extant 
discussion of what distinguishes behavior from other performances of agents, or of how
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behavior-types should be individuated (a notable exception is Dretske [1988], who 
argues convincingly that behavior is the endogenous causing of e.g. bodily movement, 
rather than endogenously caused bodily movement). Self-motion (e.g. walking but not 
being pushed) is generally regarded as behavior, but pumping blood and healing
damaged tissue are generally not regarded as behavior (at least not as the behavior of
agents rather than of their parts, or at least not by cognitive scientists rather than
biologists).
Since the extant discussion is limited, I will describe three fat-footed
interpretations of behavior designed to mirror rather than rationalize common
patterns of judgment. According to behaviorα a performance counts as behavior
only if it is an observable moving of the body, where by “observable” I mean that the
movement is of the body’s surfaces (so changes of heart rate are excluded), it is
macroscopic, and it occurs on roughly animal-like time scales (so slower processes like 
growth are excluded). behaviorα captures the common judgments that microbes and 
plants do not behave, except perhaps dramatic plant performances like those 
characteristic of a Venus fytrap. But animals behave, as do naval vessels and robots like
Herbert. Our paradigmatically cognitive cases also involve the management of
behaviorα. My recognition of Sanna’s face in virtue of cortical activity is a cognitive 
process, since linguistic performances—e.g. saying “Hi, Sanna,”—are observable
movings of the body that are managed in part by face recognition mechanisms. Likewise,
a typical human’s navigation of a city is an observable moving of the body.
Te extension of behaviorα is a proper subset of the extensions of the other two
interpretations. According to behaviorβ a performance is behavior only if it is an
observable moving of the body or it is a tropism. On this interpretation, plant
phototropism counts as behavior. Tis interpretation mirrors the judgments of those 
who characterize some plant performances as behavior (e.g. presumably contributors
to the journal Plant Signaling & Behavior, established in 2006). Calvo (Calvo Garzón, 
2007; Calvo Garzón & Keijzer, 2011) freely characterizes certain plant performances as
behaviors, but offers no explicit criterion distinguishing behaviors from non-behavioral
performances. He does offer a representation-in-absence criterion for distinguishing
“cognitive” behavior from “reactive” behavior (2007, p. 210), but this seems to be a 
requirement on what I call “sensitivity,” rather than a criterion for distinguishing
behaviors from non-behaviors.
Evan Tompson and others (Lyon, 2006; van Duijn et al., 2006; Tompson, 2010)
have suggested that all (or almost all) living organisms have cognitive processes, so they
must consider at least some microbial performances to be behavior. According to
   
          
             
    
        
        
         
       
              
                 
            
      
        
   
    
               
 
  
            
               
  
           
        
            
          
 
               
 
            
            
           
             
18 M. AKAGI
behaviorγ a performance is behavior only if it is an observable moving of the body
or it is a taxis at any time- and length-scale. On this interpretation, bacterial
magnetotaxis counts as behavior.
Bacterial magnetotaxis and plant phototropism fall in the gap between the
extensions of the more conservative behaviorα and the more liberal extensions of
behaviorβ–γ, which is appropriate for controversial cases of cognition. Tis set of
three interpretations for behavior is disappointing with regard to analytical clarity,
but modular analyses aim to articulate seams of disagreement, and so much the better
for the analysis if some of those seams have not yet received the attention they merit. If
SMH is correct, then philosophers interested in vindicating or denying the possibility
of plant and microbe cognition might fruitfully attend to the question of what behavior 
is, rather than focusing so exclusively on representation.
[Table 2 around here.]
6. Applying the Sensitive Management Hypothesis 
Te sensitive management hypothesis is a modular analysis of cognition. It classifes 
each of the test cases correctly using the toy parameter values I discussed, including the
consensually cognitive phenomena in every sectarian extension, excluding
consensually non-cognitive phenomena from every sectarian extension, and including
each of the controversially cognitive phenomena in some sectarian extensions but not
others. See Table 2 for examples of variation in the extension of cognition based on
different sets of interpretations for parameters; note that the consensual cases of face-
recognition and unassisted navigation are in every sectarian extension, and consensual
non-cases of cognition are in no sectarian extension. Tus, I have motivated the 
sensitive management hypothesis as a prima facie adequate analysis proper of the
scientifc concept of cognition, one that leaves open the border war disputes that
cognitive scientists have not yet resolved.
Many authors have suggested that there is no need for a defnition or analysis of
cognition (e.g. Allen, 2017; Ramsey, 2017; Chemero, 2009, 212n8; Clark, 2010b, 62). 
Carol Cleland (2012) argues that in chemistry and biology, good defnitions follow
open-minded inquiry rather than preceding it. I agree that that an analysis is not a
prerequisite for responsible cognitive scientifc inquiry, and doubt that a compelling
analysis will resolve disputes in the cognition border wars. However, an analysis can
   
          
       
          
            
           
 
       
         
     
       
            
   
           
   
    
           
 
           
      
            
        
              
          
             
          
             
       
      
            
   
        
        
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 19
serve other kinds of purposes. I contend that SMH serves the three purposes I 
identifed in Section 1 for ecumenical characterizations of cognition.
First, the sensitive management hypothesis makes explicit some ways cognitive
scientists think about their object of study and perspicuously represents areas of
agreement and disagreement. For example, it makes explicit that cognitive scientists
explain by identifying and describing mechanisms (in the anodyne sense described in 
Section 4), that cognitive mechanisms are ascribed relative to an agent or containing 
system, and that mechanisms are considered cognitive only if their operations are 
sensitive to an agent’s circumstances and they regulate an agent’s behavior. Te value of
conceptual analysis generally consists in articulating the relations between the analyzed
concept and a system of theoretical concepts; SMH makes claims about the relations
between cognition and other concepts in the philosophy of cognitive science, such
as mechanism, agent/representational subject, representation, and
behavior. Tese relations are less strictly defned than some more classical
conceptions of cognition (e.g. the classical computational theory of cognition; Ramsey, 
2007), but this is appropriate since cognitive science is less theoretically unifed than it 
once was. And SMH represents disagreement by treating open questions as unsettled. 
Its parameters correspond to matters on which cognitive scientists provide conficting
judgments.
Second, the sensitive management hypothesis could clarify the concept of cognition
in classrooms and public communication. Introductory science textbooks ofen begin
with “defnitions” of their subject matter that, while helpful for students, are
philosophically unsatisfactory, and cognitive science introductions ofen invoke
familiar slogans like “the mind is the sofware of the brain” or “the mind is what the
brain does.” SMH can fulfll this sort of role, facilitated by its abbreviated slogan that 
“cognition is the sensitive management of an agent’s behavior,” which is less susceptible
to obvious counterexamples than the familiar alternatives and more specifc than others
like “the function of the brain is sensorimotor processing.” My suggestion is not, of
course, that the sensitive management view be described to novices along with a lengthy
commentary about the values of its parameters. Rather, even without such commentary
SMH is a less hand-wavy characterization of cognition, and one that scaffolds further
understanding by incorporating reference to mechanisms, behavior, agents, and
representation (i.e. sensitivity to circumstances). For more advanced students,
examining the possible interpretations for the parameters of SMH is a scaffold for
deeper understanding of extant theoretical disagreements.
   
           
        
           
             
            
     
           
             
 
           
 
  
          
          
             
     
  
 
   
           
        
         
    
 
   
    
          
            
            
       
          
             
             
20 M. AKAGI
Tird, when the sensitive management hypothesis is considered along with its
modular logical apparatus (i.e. including well-specifed domains for licit parameters), it 
is a precise tool for representing various background commitments of cognitive
scientists. Tis precision makes it valuable as a resource for appeal in philosophical
arguments that draw on facts about cognitive scientifc practice. Such appeals are
common in disputes about the mind-body problem, multiple realizability, reductionism,
and other philosophical topics. At present, philosophers ofen rely on functionalist
formalisms, despite the fact that functionalism is known to have shortcomings as an
expressive resource for empirical claims (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Shagrir, 2005; 
Sprevak, 2009). SMH may offer some fresh resources for engaging in old debates, 
especially since the values of parameters can be tailored for different argumentative or 
rhetorical purposes.
A further virtue of SMH is that it can be improved by increments. Philosophers and
cognitive scientists can augment the set of toy interpretations I describe above. Disputes
over the better and worse interpretations of one parameter are largely independent of
similar disputes over the other parameters. Since parameters represent terms with
determinable extensions, they will ofen correspond to strategies for adjudicating 
disputes about the extension of cognition. Some of these strategies may be well-
worn, like the strategy of adjudicating disputes about the extension of cognition by
appealing to various conceptions of representation. However, a modular analysis may
demonstrate its value by drawing attention to concepts like behavior whose analysis
might prove fruitful, but that have so far received little attention.
7. Conclusion 
While many sciences feature disagreement regarding the nature of their object of
inquiry (e.g. life, the physical, the chemical), cognitive science is unusual in that the 
extension of cognition is highly controversial. Tis fact makes cognitive science 
unusually difficult to understand and reason about—for students, laypeople, humanist
scholars of cognitive science, and cognitive scientists themselves. Tese difficulties
might be eased by an analysis of the cognitive scientist’s inclusive concept of
cognition that, unlike extant “marks of the cognitive,” aims to clearly represent
controversies over the extension of cognition rather than to resolve them. Te
sensitive management hypothesis is such an analysis. Since it is modular, its extension
can vary according to the various licit interpretations for its parameters. Using a
restricted set of simple interpretations, I illustrated how the analysis handles a variety
   
               
           
           
     
       
         
         
          
            
          
        
             
   
                 
      
     
          
                 
          
            
        
             
    
              
         
             
       
           
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 21
of test cases, and made a prima facie argument that the analysis proper is extensionally
adequate, in that with a toy set of parameter values its sectarian extensions always
include the paradigmatic test cases of cognition, never include consensual non-cases of
cognition, and selectively include or exclude controversial cases of cognition depending
on which set of interpretations is assigned.
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Table 1: Selected interpretations for parameters of SMH .
agentα A mechanism belongs to an agent only if it is part of the body of a
biological organism.
agentβ A mechanism belongs to an agent if and only if it regularly and reliably
promotes the goals of a biological organism.
agentγ A mechanism belongs to an agent if and only if it regularly and reliably
promotes the goals of a goal-apt system.
sensitivityα A mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances only if represents 
some of those circumstances and the representational content is non-
derived.
sensitivityβ A mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances only if represents 
some of those circumstances.
sensitivityγ A mechanism is sensitive to an agent’s circumstances if it functions to
transform information about the agent’s circumstances.
behaviorα A performance is a behavior only if it is the observable moving of the
body.
behaviorβ A performance is a behavior only if it is the observable moving of the
body or it is a tropism.
behaviorγ A performance is a behavior only if it is the observable moving of the
body or it is a taxis.
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Table 2: Selected variation in the sectarian extension of cognition according to SMH .




face-recognition in typical humans




face-recognition in typical humans
urban navigation in typical humans




face-recognition in typical humans
urban navigation in typical humans
embodied audition in crickets
agentγ face-recognition in typical humans
sensitivityβ urban navigation in typical humans
behaviorα robot cognition in Herbert
extended cognition in Otto-notebook system
agentβ face-recognition in typical humans
sensitivityγ urban navigation in typical humans
behaviorα extended cognition in Otto-notebook system
embodied audition in crickets
agentα face-recognition in typical humans
sensitivityγ urban navigation in typical humans
behaviorβ extended cognition in Otto-notebook system
embodied audition in crickets
off-line phototropism in L. cretica
agentγ face-recognition in typical humans
sensitivityγ urban navigation in typical humans
behaviorγ distributed cognition in maritime navigation
extended cognition in Otto-notebook
robot cognition in Herbert
embodied audition in crickets
magnetotaxis in bacteria
